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8 April 1966

"THE VOICE OF THE TURTLE IS HEARD" PROGRAMS TO DEVELOP MILITARY WRITERS IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGY

By

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JUL 18 1966

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USAWC RESEARCH ELEMENT
(Research Paper)

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Programs to Develop Military Writers in
the Field of Strategy

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
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SUMMARY

Many opinions have been given for the lack of strategic writers in uniform since World War II. The comment has been made often that the military have abdicated this field to civilian scholars or "lay" strategists. The reasons offered for this situation are many: the lack of time because of stringent duty requirements; the working environment of the professional soldier; the requirement for security clearances. Some civilian writers even state that there is a lack of capable talent in the military profession, a lack of ability to write on strategic matters.

This study discusses, first, the reasons why the professional soldier should produce articles and books on strategy and international affairs. The lay scholar is then compared with the professional soldier to determine whether or not the military has the capability for such an effort. Included in this comparison are statistics from a questionnaire intended to provide data on working environments of the civilian scholar and the professional soldier.

The problem of clearances is discussed in detail. Background of present Department of Defense clearance policies and examples of clearance refusals are included. It is significant that the author feels little can be accomplished in developing military writers on strategic affairs unless the clearance policies can be made more realistic.

Development programs considered include career programs, sabbaticals and fellowships, and a miscellaneous group which can be termed "on-the-job" scholarship. The talent required, the working environment needed, and the advantages and disadvantages of each proposal are discussed. Final conclusions are drawn and a program recommended which is feasible and which could be instituted immediately.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the years prior to World War II, the general field of strategy and national security was almost exclusively the property of the military services. True, a few civilians scholars ventured into these uncharted areas but these, for the most part, were historians or biographers and not strategists discussing concepts and theories involving the security of the Nation. To the average American reader, the field was even less interesting.

A tremendous change, however, occurred on the American scene in the two decades following World War II. Where isolationism had been the keystone of American foreign policy prior to 1940, the postwar years found the United States deeply involved in foreign affairs. Occupation forces overseas, improved means of communication, confrontation of the Communist cold war effort, billions of dollars spent on foreign aid, the advent of the nuclear age, and the Korean conflict all awakened the American citizen to the cold, hard fact that a return to the idealistic isolationism of the prewar years was impossible.

He also began to realize that his country's foreign policy had a direct effect upon his everyday life, that events taking place in unfamiliar foreign lands related to his own way of living, and that the welfare of other peoples affected his own personal well-being. This awareness was generated in many ways, all

personal to the individuals concerned: increased taxation to support foreign aid programs, the growth of defense-type industries, the cost of the large peacetime military structure, and military service at home and abroad by thousands of young men, either as volunteers or draftees.

As a result of his awakening to the international scene, this American began to ask questions. He sought information on the reasons for the foreign policy of his government. He became vitally interested in national security and strategy. Gradually--and, in some cases, with shock--he became aware of his own shortcomings and his lack of knowledge in such matters, and, therefore, began to seek answers to questions raised in his discussions with his contemporaries.

This interest should not have been surprising to the men in government, to the military, nor to the scholarly community. As McCloy told a West Point audience:

. . . it is quite natural that wider interests are being displayed in such matters. The casualties and the loss of values threatened to civilians are so astronomically high that, even without subsidies, it is quite understandable that civilians should become preoccupied with matters that so deeply affect them.¹

Initially there was little factual information available. However, in the late 1940's and early 1950's a vast amount of material began to appear. The vast majority of these writings

¹ John J. McCloy, Address at West Point, 25 May 1963.

were produced by civilian scholars or by professional journalists. The continued United States participation in world affairs to the present time has increased the public interest and has resulted in a still more vast amount of informational and educational material being produced.

The authors of these works on strategy, foreign affairs, and national security represent every scholarly field and profession except one: the military itself. Very few scholarly works have appeared over the by-line of the professional soldier. The majority of the works authored by the military have been the memoirs of professional officers who have retired from active duty.

Schelling asked whether the military services themselves might not be able to produce such works, pointing out that theory does not have to be developed solely by specialists in isolated universities. "If the military services are intellectually prepared to make effective use of military force," he said, "it might seem that they are equipped to theorize about it."²

This lack of professional military writings becomes even more perplexing when compared to the works of professionals in other fields. Professional soldiers and civilian scholars alike wonder at the profound silence of the military scholar. Brodie compares the soldier to the economist, pointing out that:

The economic profession has produced a tremendous body of literature of impressive quality. The far

²Thomas C. Schelling, "The Strategy of Conflict," p. 9.

older profession of arms, content with mere reiteration of its wholly elementary postulates, which change not with the changing years, has yet to round out a five-foot bookshelf of significant works on strategy.³

Although Brodie admits that the purpose of a professional soldier is not to produce books, he makes the assumption that any "real ferment of thought could not have so completely avoided breaking into print."⁴

All of this leads the the professional military man--soldier, sailor, airman, and marine alike--to ask, "Exactly why don't we, as a profession, write?" Is there a reason for this silence? Does not the professional military possess the know-how and the experience to theorize upon and to study strategy and national security? On the other hand, perhaps the question is, "Should the soldier write?" Could he contribute anything of value not being offered by the civilian scholar? Does his experience and education hide something intellectually valuable?

The purpose of this study is, in part, to determine the answer or answers to these questions. When this investigatory part of the study has been completed, an effort will be made to determine whether or not a positive and worthwhile program can be established to develop professional soldiers who can produce scholarly works on strategy.

³ Bernard Brodie, "Strategy as a Science," World Politics, Vol. I, No. 4, July 1949.

⁴ Ibid.

The first requirement is to determine, if possible, whether or not the soldier should write. The civilian scholars and their works will be reviewed, not from the standpoint of analyzing what they are writing, but the "who" and the "how" involved. In other words, the backgrounds of these authors and their working environment will be discussed.

This background and environment will then be compared with similar areas for a selected group of officers in an effort to determine whether or not military experience and military environment are conducive to the production of scholarly writings. The effect of clearance requirements imposed upon the military will be investigated to determine whether or not such restrictions "stifle" individual thinking.

Although not intended to be a major portion of this study, mention must be made from time to time of the "military mind" and the "military profession." It is believed that military professionalism and the attitudes of the military mind inherent in the true professional both have direct bearing upon his writing or not writing, as the case may be.

The primary purpose of this study, however, is the determination of a program for developing military writers in the general field of strategy. Various alternative methods of achieving this goal will be discussed with the ultimate objective of determining a logical and feasible program. Intent of the program will be the elimination of the vacuumatic silence of the professional soldier

and the fulfillment of the need expressed by President Kennedy,
"The military has the right and the necessity to express their
educated views on some of the great problems that face us around
the world."⁵

⁵ Transcript of Presidential News Conference, New York Times,
11 August 1961, p. 6.

CHAPTER 2

A DIFFERENT DRUMMER?

WHY MILITARY SCHOLARS SHOULD WRITE

"If a man does not keep pace with his companions, perhaps it is because he hears a different drummer. Let him step to the music which he hears, however measured or far away."¹

In the introduction of this study, reference was made to the awakening interest of the "American" to matters of strategy and national security. Before discussing the reasons why the military scholars have remained quiet, it is essential that a look be taken at this "American" who is, basically, responsible for the great increase of material available in the general field of strategy. Who is he? What are his interests in national security, foreign affairs and strategy?

THE STRATEGIC PUBLICS

Public relations experts refer to their audiences as "publics," and the term has been adopted by other professions as well. Snyder and Furniss cite three general publics interested in American foreign policy:

¹Henry David Thoreau, Walden, XVIII, Conclusion.

Mass public.

Attentive public--roughly five to ten percent of the mass public, who, because of their individual intellectual activities, take a continuous interest in foreign affairs, are aware of all its major issues, and are, comparatively, the best informed citizens.

Effective public--public opinion leaders² because they influence the opinion of the mass public.

The latter group is subdivided into organized groups which are politically active: mass communications leaders and media, teachers, clergy, nongovernmental foreign policy experts, and community leaders. These are the individuals who have the most influence within and effect upon both the mass and attentive American publics.

Unfortunately, the mass public comprising some ninety to ninety-five percent of the total is the group which, to use an old public relations cliché, "read the headlines, listen to the radio, and watch television." They are, however, directly and profoundly influenced by the members of Snyder's third public, particularly by the mass communications leaders and their media. This public is not interested in the scholarly works of academicians nor does it seek the intellectual self-improvement to be gained in reading such works.

The "American" referred to in the introduction to this study, however, does not belong to the mass public, but rather to the

²Richard Snyder and Edgar Furniss, Jr., American Foreign Policy, p. 523.

attentive public. These are the individuals who may be termed the thinking Americans, men and women who because of their intellectual curiosities seek the background information not available in the mass communications media. Their interests and the studies of a small group of scholars led to the great increase in strategic writing in the years following World War II.

While this may be an excellent division of the American publics from the standpoint of the social scientist, the soldier-scholar views his audiences from a different point of view. The audiences of the soldier must be linked to his reason for writing on strategy. He must provide his analysis of national security affairs, his theorization of strategic actions, and his interpretation of the effect of current events upon the American way of life--provide these for equal consideration with other concepts and ideas any who would choose to read his works.

THE MILITARY PUBLICS

Nevertheless, the soldier-scholar does have three specific publics in whom he has special interest: his military contemporaries, the civilian scholars, and the mass communication media leaders. His interest in each group has different motives; his reception by each is, at present, varied.

Primarily, the uniformed scholar is interested in the fellow members of his own profession. While some military men, relatively few, have available much background information on varied aspects

of national security--and this primarily because of their duty assignments--the vast majority of the men and officers of the Armed Services have little access to such information. The data referred to is not the published scholarly works but, rather, original source information.

Encouraged to improve their intellectual backgrounds by supplemental reading lists distributed by the services, these same officers and men are dumfounded by the lack of military interpretations of national affairs. There is no published military analysis of the use of atomic weapons; few soldiers write about counterinsurgency; a military interpretation of the Cuban crisis does not exist. Even his own professional journals provide more or less sterile discussions of current foreign affairs and national strategy. The military professional seeks strategic analysis and discussions of foreign affairs which are based upon military knowledge and requirements in order to improve himself intellectually and professionally. His professional improvement has one objective: to better serve the Nation in a lifetime career as a professional soldier.

Even when military works are available, the soldier supplements the knowledge to be gained from these by constant reference to the writings of the civilian scholar. Despite charges that the military mind is narrow; that it is developed only to use force without considering the reasons for its use; that it "also includes

an antitheoretical bias which is also anti-intellectual;"³ the professional soldier, when few if any scholarly works are available with a military background, turns solely and completely to the discussions and analyses of the civilian scholars for background information. He may then attempt to interpret these writings based upon his own personal education and military experience.

This situation, however, has difficulties for many professional soldiers. As Guelzo stated:

These scholars bring into the armed forces an attitude and a means of expression neither of the battlefield nor the world of commerce: their language and methods of analysis are those of the classroom--and more often than not at the graduate level.⁴

Although the armed services have placed great emphasis upon graduate training of their officers, many soldiers have not had the opportunity of further education in civilian institutions following their being commissioned. The desire for improvement may be present in the individual officer, but the lack of understanding of the methods, the viewpoints, and the terminology of the civilian scholar all tend to place an intellectual barricade between the officer and the source of the information he seeks.

It is this public, his own contemporaries, that the military scholar is most interested in reaching. The intellectual

³ Bernard Brodie, "Strategy as a Science," World Politics, Vol. I, No. 4, July 1949.

⁴ Major Carl M. Guelzo, "Soldiers Who Are Scholars," Army, Vol. 13, No. 12, July 1963, p. 38.

development of this public is essential to the improvement of the nation's defenses; the professional development is equally important. And professional development cannot exist solely upon military education and normal duty assignments; it requires also an understanding, based upon military interpretation, of strategy and national security.

The second public in which the soldier-scholar is interested is composed of the civilian scholars. In other words, he is interested in those educators and scholars whose primary field of interest and effort involves strategy, foreign affairs, and national security--those same conceptual areas in which the professional soldier labors daily. Furthermore, this interest stems from the resultant effect of the collective works of this scholarly group, the influence upon his own military profession as well as upon Snyder's attentive American public. Because their efforts represent the vast bulk of background information readily available, because of the scholarly methodology and techniques used, and because their works are unclassified and available to all who are willing to read them, the scholars are more and more being used as authoritative sources by the mass communications media--and by the decision makers of the federal government.

The military profession, as a whole, deeply appreciates the contributions made by the scholars. Some segments of that profession, however, are inclined to criticize the scholar because "he

doesn't have all the facts" or "he is prejudiced in his discussions," or "he doesn't get the big picture." Such criticisms represent a parochial attitude based upon ignorance and bias-- ignorance of what the scholar is trying to accomplish and bias based upon personal knowledge of classified information to which the scholar does not have access. This represents one extreme feeling toward the civilian scholar.

An opposite extreme also exists, this being found in the soldier who has no access to original source information, classified or unclassified. Too often he accepts the views of the scholar completely and without reservation, personal or professional. This particularly applies to younger officers serving with troop units and to a few senior officers as well. As a result, these soldiers find that they must reeducate themselves to eliminate preconceived ideas when assigned to a position where they are exposed to and must work with the very problems discussed by the civilian scholar. In some instances, the change requires a complete realignment of opinion and rearrangement of mental processes to accomplish an objective solution of studies assigned.

The soldier scholar's interest in the scholarly public, then, is to make available to them his concepts and theories for whatever study and analysis the scholar might care to make. Although the scholar may be willing to consult and digest the works of many professions, he has little military meat in his present meal.

The third public in which the military scholar is interested is the mass communications leaders and their media. The military scholar's interest in mass media derives from the fact that the media more and more rely upon the works of the scholar for background information and concepts. With daily or less periodic articles to be written, the media representatives seldom have the time--and often not the ability--to accomplish original and pure research. Therefore, these writers rely primarily upon the works of the scholar for data. It is true that some, Drew Pearson for example, quote extensively their own "original sources" of information. Such information as published is often nebulous, however, and as often fanciful as it is true or factual. Other media writers, such as Hanson Baldwin, do make a sincere and forceful effort to accomplish original analysis.

Regardless of the sources of their information, the communication media exert great influence upon Snyder's mass public and, to a lesser degree, upon the attentive and influential publics as well. The scholars themselves are, in turn, influenced by the media and often refer to media authors as sources. It can be deduced, therefore, that the military public is also influenced by the media. It can also be stated that the civilian members of the government, for various reasons, also feel the strong influences of the mass media.

THE STRATEGIC SCHOLARS

Awakening interest of the attentive public in foreign affairs, national security, and strategy contributed greatly to the entrance of the scholar into the field. Cold War, Berlin Blockade, Marshal Plan, Korea, nuclear armament race, space efforts--all of these led to demands by the attentive public for information to feed its intellectual needs. The response came, not from the government, not from its individual members, but from the scholarly community.

Academicians, who have heretofore had to content themselves with studies on some literary, historical, or physical obscurity, suddenly find that they are being well paid, or at least encouraged, to deal with the heady wine of military strategy, methods of mass destruction, and power politics.⁵

Almost every field of scholastic endeavor is represented: historian, social scientist, mathematician, economist, sociologist, and many others. Each scholar has brought with him the methodology, terminology, and the basic technology of his particular field. The historian has brought an appreciation of the past and a realization that one may benefit from the mistakes and learn from the accomplishments of others. The mathematician has brought with him the exactness of his science; the social scientist, the means of analyzing human societies. All have contributed materially to the general field of strategy. The result has been the emergence of a new profession whose members "move freely through

⁵ John J. McCloy, Address at West Point, N. Y., 25 May 1963.

the corridors of the Pentagon and the State Department rather as the Jesuits through the courts of Madrid and Vienna three centuries ago."⁶

The advent of the scholar into the field of strategy at such a late date, relatively, is most unfortunate. He has brought to the field sound methodology, careful collection and evaluation of data, detailed and completely objective analysis--processes which would have been most beneficial in the past had they been used. Most important of all, the very fact that the scholar represents not one discipline but many has emphasized that strategy and national security involve not one profession or discipline but consist of relevant knowledge from many professions and fields.

The strategic expert is, as Lyons states:

. . . both unlike and like experts in other fields. His expertise is based on a definite body of knowledge that is broader than those of the traditional professions and disciplines and includes many of them A characteristic quality is, in fact, the relating of relevant knowledge from many professions and disciplines.

It is ironic and indicative that, despite Lyon's indication that the general field of strategy involves many professions and disciplines, one finds writers from almost every profession except the military. With the exception of a very few military authors, most books and articles written by professional soldiers are

⁶Daniel Bell, "The Dispossessed," Columbia Forum, Vol. V, No. 4, Fall 1962.

⁷Gene M. Lyons and Louis Morton, Schools for Strategy, p. 31.

memoirs of the "I was there" category. The reasons for military silence are discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of this study. It is sufficient at this point to state only that the general field of strategy, despite its military implications and military requirements, has been taken over and completely dominated by the civilian scholar.

SHOULD THE MILITARY BE HEARD?

If Lyon's contention that strategy is an all-encompassing field is correct, that it represents the concepts and knowledge of many professions--then the voice of the military scholar must be heard. The attentive American public, that group which selects information for its own intellectual improvement, should have available the knowledge of all the scholarly professions concerned with strategy and security. That public today can find the historian's analysis, the economist's theories, the mathematician's war games and formulae, the jurist's legal interpretation, the political scientist's concepts, and the philosopher's ideology. But the professional soldier remains conspicuous by his absence.

No one can dispute the fact that there are military implications in foreign affairs, that national security does involve the soldier, and that strategy does include military requirements. Moreover, with possible high casualty rates and a comparable loss of value, property, and way of life resultant in any conflict, the

attentive American public and the mass public as well become increasingly preoccupied with matters that could so deeply affect them. Most unfortunately, these Americans are not provided with the complete and full picture of strategy. The military portion of that picture has been left a vacuum by default.

The public in whom the military scholar is most interested, his own contemporary professional soldiers, has been forced to rely upon the civilian scholar for intellectual improvement. Whereas the lawyer may choose professional legal writings prepared by other jurists; the doctor, treatises by other doctors; the political scientist, the works of his own profession; the soldier must rely upon the published writings of professions other than his own. As a result, the soldier does not have available the theories, analyses, and concepts in which he is most interested, the military analysis of national security affairs.

The attentive public also is limited in its selection of material for its intellectual improvement. It can read the writings of a scholar from any desired profession--but none by the soldier. As a result, this intellectual improvement is incomplete, lacking an understanding of the military implications of foreign affairs or strategy, except as estimated by the civilian scholar. This leads to a misunderstanding of the military implications and military aims of the federal government and fosters the continuation of the old mistrust of the military which was so much of the American scene prior to the World War II era.

Scholars themselves lack the military viewpoint in their meditations and discussions. Living in the isolated tranquility of the academic community, they view the arena of international conflict from an ivory tower untouched by the mundane efforts of their brethern in uniform who daily struggle in that very arena. The scholar forms his concepts based upon available research data and by studying the works of other scholars. Professor Karl W. Deutsch, in his introduction to Rapoport's "Strategy and Conscience," states that:

In directing so much of our time and attention--and of the nation's time and attention--to images of terror and ruthless destruction, and so little to any images of moderation, compromise, and mutual accommodation the strategists are making some headway in making us over in the image of their craft.⁸

Because of his limited access to original source material, the scholars have developed an interdependence upon each other. There are constant references to works of another scholar, phraseology too common to remain unnoticed, and a similarity in thought and analysis too striking to be ignored. Even a newly coined language is iterated and reiterated until it becomes as grating as the words of a television commercial. Irving Horowitz describes it:

⁸ Anatol Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience, p. x.

While it is clear that they exhibit many policy differences in their thinking, a collective portrait nevertheless does emerge. They have a shared philosophy, a common approach to problems.⁹

The criticism thus stated, however, cannot be applied blanket-wise to the entire scholarly community. Many of these men work closely with the federal government in one capacity or another. Some have served as special consultants; others have held appointive positions. Consequently, their writings do reflect a firsthand knowledge based upon personal experience--at the time of contact with or employment by the federal government. Nor can one ignore service with various research or "think" organizations as another major source of information. These firms utilize the best talent available and hence lean heavily upon the academic community for personnel either on a permanent or temporary basis. Kahn, Schelling, and Brodie are only three examples of the many scholars who have worked with research groups in one capacity or another.

Even these men, however, lack full access to information available to the professional soldier on a daily basis. Furthermore, they do not have the benefit of the long professional experience of the soldier and the foreign service personnel of the State Department. Transitory exposure by temporary government service or by work with a research organization can never replace the

⁹Irving M. Horowitz, The War Game, p. 11.

experience gained from day-to-day exposure to the policy making processes. No study of documents, classified or unclassified, can replace first hand knowledge to be gained by personal and direct participation. The benefit of such experience is rarely available to the scholar.

One can only speculate on what use the mass communication media might make of military writings. These media pride themselves upon the accuracy of their reporting and the detail of their background information. Radio and television commentators, newspaper columnists, and magazine writers all attempt to present an authoritative realistic picture for their own publics to digest. One can detect, however, the reliance upon the work of the scholar by terminology, wording, and concepts used. If works of military scholars were available for reference, these media representatives might have a better understanding of the military aspects of strategy and security, something which seems to be lacking in so many instances.

Many of the scholarly strategists have become officials in the federal government as a direct result of the published works they have produced. Lyons lists Dean Rusk, Paul Nitze, McGeorge Bundy, Walter Rostow, Charles Hitch, and Roger Hilsman among the more outstanding.¹⁰ These men filled appointive positions. Others

¹⁰ Gene M. Lyons and Louis Morton, Schools for Strategy, p. 45.

who have been closely associated are Brodie, Wohlstetter, Kahn, Bowie, Kissinger, Schelling, Huntington, Sohn, Milliken, Kaufman, Bloomfield, Knorr, and Fox. This would indicate that a great deal of influence is exerted by the group, not only upon the attentive American public, but also upon the elected officials. It is therefore even more important that the scholar be presented with the military estimates and considerations of strategy and security for without a knowledge of the military implications the scholar is as unqualified as the soldier who ignores the economic or political considerations of military policy.

Clausewitz presented this theory a century ago. Often quoted are his words that war "is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself."¹¹ Ignored too often, however, is his contention that:

. . . it is an unpermissible and even harmful distinction, according to which a great military event or the plan for such an event, should admit a purely military judgment; indeed, it is an unreasonable procedure to consult professional soldiers on the plan of war, that they may give a purely military opinion, as it is frequently done by cabinets; but still more absurd is the demand of theorists that a statement of the available means of war should be laid before the general that he may draw up a purely military plan for war or for the campaign in accordance with them.¹²

George Lowe updates this theory stating,

Changing world conditions and technological conditions have created a situation where, in General Maxwell

¹¹Karl Von Clausewitz, On War, p. 596.

¹²Ibid., p. 599.

Taylor's words, there are 'no longer any purely military matters.' . . . Shrewd and long-time government servants like Wilfred J. McNeil have correctly stated that 'the need was never greater for fully professional military men. There is a necessity for the realism of the true professional.'¹³

Discussing the use of systems analysis by the federal government, Charles Hitch expressed his belief that such was only a method of placing relevant information before the decision maker. "It is no substitute for sound and experienced military judgment, and it is but one of the many kinds of information needed by the decision maker."¹⁴

The professional soldier has been ignored to a large extent by the scholar. He has been criticized both justly and unjustly for both a narrow and a broad outlook. It must be admitted, however, the soldier often "with vested interests in military doctrines and weapons systems derived from their own by-now parochial experiences, find themselves in danger of being shelved or ignored."¹⁵ The best mental efforts of military thinkers have too often been wasted in petty interservice issues in the joint staff arena. One almost wonders if the planning staffs of the three services in the Pentagon have not been formed less for creative thought than for fighting the interservice battle for resources.

¹³George E. Lowe, "The Importance of Being Professional," Army, Vol. 16, No. 1, January 1966.

¹⁴Charles J. Hitch, Decision Making for Defense, p. 53.

¹⁵Bell, op. cit.

Ginsburgh maintains that "This growing body of academic or lay strategists is being used more and more to challenge the views of the professional military man."¹⁶ He cites, as examples, the growing influence of the group in the federal government, the decrease of military representation in affairs of state, and the changes in organization and procedure affected as a result of civilian-scholar concepts. This contention is further substantiated by Joseph Kraft's contention that:

The Academic Strategists emerge as a key factor in the maintenance of civilian control over the Armed Forces. . . . Their generalizations provide civilian officials with a useful yardstick for judging rival services and for keeping the whole defense establishment in line with the Nation's strategic goals.¹⁷

The voice of the scholar is heard; the soldier remains silent. Equal consideration of the military point of view is not possible, not necessarily because that view is withheld, but rather because it is completely absent. The scholar, gifted with the cloak of Academic Freedom, can speculate publicly; his concepts, based upon his research and contemplation, are made a matter of public discussion. The concepts of the military scholar remain in his mind or, at best, in official and unpublished studies.

Furniss asks if the situation might not be improved if greater emphasis were placed upon publication and adds:

¹⁶Colonel Robert Ginsburgh, "The Challenge to the Military," Foreign Affairs, January 1966, p. 7.

¹⁷Ibid.

One is led to the basic conclusion that there is need for wider recognition of the importance of military doctrine as underpinning to the general orientation and the specific fields of emphasis of the national military establishment.¹⁸

To the civilian publics, the scholar has become a prophet, a twentieth century Plato, a modern Clausewitz. The professional soldier is again termed militaristic; military needs are deemed a drain upon the economy; and military action is bitterly resented. The silence of the soldier has resulted in a lack of understanding of his role in national affairs.

The soldier may have no cloak of academic freedom. This is perhaps too much to hope for or to expect with the necessity for discipline and a chain of command. However, it should be possible to encourage, as Ginsburgh insists, original military thinking "without sacrificing the traditions of obedience to higher authority."¹⁹ The scholars themselves recognize the need for military writings. Brodie indicates that

Any real expansion of strategic thought to embrace the wholly new circumstances which nuclear weapons have produced will therefore have to be developed largely within the military guild itself.²⁰

Schelling complains "But where is the academic counterpart of the military profession?"²¹

¹⁸Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., American Military Policy, p. 467.

¹⁹Ginsburgh, op. cit., p. 13.

²⁰Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p. 9.

²¹Thomas C. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, p. 8.

The voice of the military scholar must be heard. His own professional contemporaries need his concepts, theories, and analyses for their military intellectual improvement. The attentive American public should have his writings available for their study if they so desire. The scholarly community should have the benefits of his military philosophy in hand for equal consideration in their academic analyses. Mass communication media require the military discussions as background for their commentaries. The scholarly and creative works of the military scholar would provide the civilian members of the federal government with a better understanding of the military implications of national affairs in comparison with the scholar's point of view. Instead of following Justice Douglas' caution that "The safety of the Republic is in unlimited discourse,"²² the soldier, because he hears a different drummer, does not keep pace with his scholarly companions.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett summed the situation in this manner:

What is true of the scientist is true of the military expert. It is not the unwarranted power of the scientist or of the military officer or of any other expert that is now the cause for our concern. Isolation is what creates the real problem--that is, power insulated from competing skills or the claims of other groups for recognition of possible alternative courses of action. Consequently, if 'knowledge is power,' as the

²² Justice William O. Douglas, Freedom of the Mind, p. 34.

old system tells us, then insulated knowledge fails to meet our needs in the making of public policy.

I believe the time has come for a new Thayer-like-break-out from the relatively narrow concept of the military profession and rigid disciplines held by my generation into studies of wider scope.²³

To paraphrase Walden's words, "Let the soldier march in step to the music HE hears, however measured or far away."

²³ Robert A. Lovett, Address at USMA, West Point, N. Y., 2 May 1964.

CHAPTER 3

BLIND MAN'S BLUFF

THE SCHOLARLY STRATEGISTS

Inherent in American political thought since the very inception of the Republic has been a deep-seated distrust of the military. This feeling was evidenced in the Constitution by the establishment of firm civilian control of the Armed Forces, by the checks and balances imposed upon the executive by the Congress. This profound dislike of things military has continued through the years. It took visible form in many instances: The establishment and restrictive continuation of a very small standing army and navy, the neglect of that force for long periods, and the near ostracizing of its members by other Americans.

Lyons describes the feeling toward the military in this manner:

There was a time when military affairs were anathema to American intellectuals. As a social institution, war was conceived to be a triumph of irrationality, and, as a political force, the military establishment was considered an instrument of authoritarian brutality. Regarded in these terms, both were understandably repugnant to that rational liberalizing spirit which is so important to the intellectual's ideal of the purpose of scholarly research and scientific investigation.¹

¹Gene M. Lyons and Louis Morton, Schools for Strategy, p. 1.

It is true that there were brief periods of intense interest in military affairs. However, for the most part, such interest was generated by involvement in a conflict. This was particularly true during the Civil War and World War I and, to a much lesser extent, during the War With Spain and the Philippine Insurrection which followed. A period of what might be termed "military enlightenment" occurred in the 1830's during John Calhoun's tenure as Secretary of the Army. Concurrent with his reorganization of the Department and overall improvement of the field forces, a tremendous interest in every phase of military science occurred. Huntington notes the "outpouring of military thought and writing which was, in many respects, unique in American history. Military societies sprang into being; military journals had brief but active lives; the idea of military profession was expounded and defended."² The interest, however, ended as suddenly as it had begun. By the 1850's, the attitude toward the military had returned to normalcy and mistrust in general. With the exception of other brief periods, the American interest in military affairs remained dormant.

The antipathy toward the military was repaid in kind by its members. Isolating themselves on military posts and naval bases, often far from the centers of population and culture, the professional military officers did little to develop an interest in

²Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 217.

military affairs on the part of the American public. It would appear that the military believed in Vanderbilt's "The public be damned" philosophy.

While some retired "name" officers--Grant, Sherman, and Pershing, for example--published memoirs, the works which were written in a scholarly fashion were very few indeed and were far from being best sellers read by the American public. The Mahans, father and son, Halleck, and Upton were almost the sole military strategists between the 1830's and World War II. Today's professional soldier may complain of the civilian scholar taking over the field of strategy, but such complaint can hardly be accepted for the soldier himself has not filled that field to overflowing with the magnitude of his own scholarly works.

The civilian or lay strategists, however, were even fewer in the field of national security. True, historians did discuss strategy but only in relation to the particular historical period being studied. Not until Edward M. Earle produced his "Makers of Modern Strategy" in 1943 did the scholarly community become interested in strategy as such.

The interest of scholars, however, showed a catalytic increase in the years following World War II, fostered tremendously by the development of research or "think" groups. The RAND Corporation, the Operations Research Organization, the Stanford Research Institute and others were organized to provide research data for

governmental and private agencies. The major source of expertise used by these corporations, at least initially, was the scholars. With large capital assets available, the "think" groups assembled the best obtainable intellectuals from a wide variety of scholarly fields and representing many colleges and universities. These men, although not experts in strategy and national security, soon became interested in the new field. Schelling, Kahn, and Kissinger, to mention only three of many, were among this group.

In the same period, the educational institutions also began to study strategy and its related fields. Yale, Princeton, Harvard, Pennsylvania, Johns Hopkins, Dartmouth, and Chicago, among others, are conducting extensive activities in this area. A survey conducted by the United States Air Force Academy in 1962 indicated that, of 115 colleges and universities responding to a questionnaire, 23 offered courses in national security and an additional 25 had plans to do so.³

The total number of scholars involved in strategic research, however, is not believed to be great. In screening the more than 600 titles pertaining to strategy and national security listed in the US Army War College Library catalog file, it was noted that only about 50 of the authors listed could be termed "experts" who had published multiple works or were primarily interested in

³Colonel William G. McDonald and Captain Larry J. Larson, National Security Policy: Some Observations on Its Place in the American University.

the field. The remaining authors had shown only transitory interest or, in the case of military writers, had produced works not intended for general publication.

To determine the background of this group of experts, 50 percent of the number were selected as a sample. The average age of the group was 45 years (as of November 1965); the youngest was 27; the oldest, 66. Fifty-nine percent had earned doctoral degrees; only one, a journalist, had only a baccalaureate degree. Fifty-six percent had been or were still associated with a research organization. One-third had served the federal government in some capacity (other than military service). It is most noteworthy, however, that less than 40 percent had had any military service. Eighty-two percent were professors in various universities at the time of the survey and nine different institutions were represented. Eleven percent were employed by research groups. The remainder equally represented government service and professional journalists.

The major scholarly fields represented by the group were widely varied. As might be expected, the group included historians, political scientists, and other representatives of the social sciences such as government. In addition, there were economists, sociologists, mathematicians, and physicists. Professional journalists and government servants were also included.

Significantly lacking were military authors. As has already been stated, the majority of the military writers who touch upon strategy do so as a part of "I Was There" or memoir-type publications. General Maxwell Taylor and Colonel Robert Ginsburgh are among the extremely few military authors whose writing can be termed as directly applying to national security and strategy. Kintner and Hilsman, of course, are both West Point graduates and served on active duty for many years. Both, however, left military service prior to writing their first book or article. Hence, they cannot be truly classified as military writers but are, instead, a part of the academic community.

It matters little what exact impetus brought the change from military domination of the field to the present situation where the scholar has become the expert. The new lay expert has brought many changes. His influences are best summarized by Lyons:

His expertise is based on a definite body of knowledge that is broader than those of the traditional professions and disciplines and includes many of these: history, politics, economics, sociology, law, psychology, military science, physics, and engineering. . . . The general characteristics of sound methodology--conceptualization, careful collection, evaluation, and selection of data organization of evidence, and analysis--are essential. But there must be also a sensitivity of the variety of methods that can be applied to aspects of national security--where it is possible to apply quantification methods, when model building is relevant, what is and what is not predictable.⁴

⁴Lyons and Morton, ibid., p. 31.

In addition to the contribution to the educational benefit of the various publics upon whom their works have fallen, the scholar in strategy has had a direct effect upon the functions of the federal government and its military and foreign policies. All too often, when the decision makers--the civilian hierarchy of the executive branch--have been confronted with anything but a unanimous decision from their advisors, both military and nonmilitary, these decision makers have turned to a third and supposedly noninterested group--the research organizations, special committees, or the scholars themselves--for information, assistance, and advice. Many of the scholars have become a part of the governmental bureaucracy they condemn at times! Their effect upon the immediate policies has been great; the future results can only be equally profound.

The advent of the scholar has indeed brought many changes, most of them for the better. The "new look"--to use the terminology of the couturiers--brought by the scholar coupled with the exclusion of the professional soldier has left the complete picture of strategy incomplete. The views and opinions of the economist and the political scientist, the mathematician and the physicist, the sociologist and the lawyer are all available and are used. None of these has devoted his life to service of country. None has had direct experience gained only through daily contact with the very problems the scholar discusses and for which he recommends solutions.

The professional soldier and the foreign servant of the State Department alone have the ability to analyze, assess and evaluate problems in strategy, foreign affairs, and national security based upon such intimate and direct experience in government service and with military or diplomatic education as a background. The failure of these men to write for general publication has been compounded by the restrictions imposed for various reasons. As a result, the attentive American public has available only a partial picture of national security affairs. This public should have available--for such choice as each individual might care to make--all aspects, all concepts, all conclusions based upon the analyses of scholars of all professions.

Webster defines "blind man's bluff" as a "game in which a blindfolded player has to catch and identify another: a variation of tag."⁵ The question, in the game of strategic writing, is "Who is the blind man?" Is it the attentive American public? Is it the scholar who produces a work based upon the knowledge, methodology, and background of his own profession? Or is it the professional soldier who remains silent?

⁵Webster's New World Dictionary, p. 156.

CHAPTER 4

THE ART OF FLAPSMANSHIP

WHY THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER DOES NOT WRITE

One cannot find a definition for "flapsmanship" in a dictionary. It is a term in the language of Pentagonese used to indicate the bureaucratic wheel-spinning and the pressures generated by real or imaginary crises. Real or imagined, "The time of crises . . . is more than a way of life; it has now become a commonplace and daily occurrence."¹

There are many contributing factors involving capability for professional writing. His education and professional experience, his innate talents and abilities, his access to source material, his working environment, the support of his superiors, and the desires of his audience--all of these have a direct effect upon the professional writer regardless of whether he be doctor, lawyer, scholar, or soldier.

Discussing these factors and their application to the soldier alone, however, would result in a biased and subjective report. Consequently, it was decided to compare a selective sample of scholars with an equal number of Army and Air Force officers. The scholarly sample used in Chapter 3 (page 28) was again utilized. The West Point Class of 1944 was used for the

¹Encore '44, p. 3.

officer sample, because the average age of the Class approximated that of the scholars (45.6 years for the scholars, 45.4 for the West Point group). An additional reason for selection of the West Point group was the ready availability of biographical data which was current as of their twentieth anniversary.

The samples used were, admittedly, highly selective and were not intended to be representative cross sections of their respective personnel. The primary purpose of the samples was to provide comparative information regarding time and environment. Identical questionnaires regarding environment and working conditions were sent to both groups. In addition, the scholars were questioned regarding certain interests in the field of strategy while the West Pointers were questioned regarding their ability and desires to write.

EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE

The 59 percent of the scholars who have doctoral degrees are a drastic contrast to the combined military group who have only one member studying toward such a degree. However, the total percentage having graduate degrees compares favorably: over 99 percent of the scholars and over 98 percent of the West Point graduates. All of the West Point group had 21 years of commissioned service at the time the survey was made. All had served in normal assignment patterns. Their average time with troop command duty was less than four years. This contrasts with an average of over

six years duty with a General Staff at Army or comparable level for the Army members of the sample; over four years for the Air Force officers. Forty percent of the Army men had attended one of the War Colleges; 28 percent of the Air Force.

The present assignments of the two military portions of the sample indicate the wide variety of duties encountered by professional soldiers and airmen. One Army officer is a professor at the United States Military Academy; he has a counterpart at the Air Force Academy. There are staff officers at SHAPE, US Forces Japan, Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. One Army man commands a Nike Hercules battalion; an Air Force officer, a squadron. Research and development work claims 20 percent of the combined sample; the Atomic Energy Commission, two percent. Also represented are the faculties of both the Army and Air War Colleges as well as an assistant military attache.

On the other hand, the scholars also present a variety of basic interests. Eighty-two percent are professors at nine different universities. Eleven percent are staff members of research or "think" organizations. Professional journalists and a member of the State Department are included.

Primary fields of research or study of the scholars are widely varied. Represented are economics, history, government, sociology, psychology, mathematics, political science, and physics.

Nineteen different colleges and universities were attended by the group in the pursuance of graduate study.

In contrast to the 21 years of continued service for the West Point samples, less than 40 percent of the scholarly group had any active service in uniform. One-third, however, had served the federal government either in consultant capacity or in an appointive position. Only 26 percent had evinced any interest in strategy and national security prior to 1945; an additional 34 percent between 1945 and 1955. The remainder first became interested in the field after 1955.

The West Point groups pursued their graduate study in many fields. These include physics, chemistry, management, political science, engineering, electronics, and international affairs. Some of the group are serving in assignments utilizing their graduate work; some are not.

Although the comparison of the educational backgrounds and fields of study of the military and civilian groups is of interest, the primary purpose of the sample was not intended to prove or disprove the educational qualifications of the individuals. The objective was to obtain comparative data of the environment in which normal day-to-day activities take place.

ENVIRONMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS

Questions related to environmental conditions were designed to provide a comparison of normal working environs. Information

was requested regarding office space available, number of individuals in the office, hour requirements, and the number of days required each week.

All of the civilian scholars have private offices. These vary in size from 150 square feet to 480 square feet. Average for the entire group was 253 square feet, the equivalent of a room approximately 15 feet by 17 feet.

Less than 25 percent of the combined military group had private offices. These include the professors at the two academies, the two unit commanders, the assistant attache, the officer on the US Forces Japan staff, and several project managers in Army and Air Force research development.

Size of office varied from 138 square feet to 540 square feet (the latter belonged to the Air Force squadron commander!) with the average size being 154 square feet, the equivalent of an office approximately 12 by 13 feet. However, as many as nine individuals used the same office; the average number per room was three. Consequently, the number of square feet per individual is considerably less than the average 154 square foot office: only 47 square feet per individual, the equivalent of a space 9 feet by 5 feet!

Generally, the data for both Army and Air Force officers followed the pattern discussed. Air Force offices, however, were slightly larger and there were fewer individuals in the same room.

The contrast between the scholar and the officer is most evident in their respective working environments. One must seriously question the suitability of offices housing nine people, at least from the standpoint of whether or not contemplative thought is possible. The omnipresent telephone on each desk, the jangling of a bell, the clacking staccato of a typewriter, the voices of others discussing their problems--are these conducive to productive study?

The art of flapsmanship appears to prosper best in conditions such as these. It has become the norm for military offices to have as many desks jammed in as possible. The Pentagon is a prime example of the shoehorn technique with desks facing each other, desks facing a wall, desks side by side. Fortunate indeed is the colonel or lieutenant colonel who shares an office with only two other officers or with a secretary. Only slightly less fortunate is the officer who has a cubicle to himself, a space less private than the carell of a good college library.

This situation is not restricted to the Pentagon; it is prevalent in almost every headquarters, Army and Air Force alike. Nor are Army educational institutions exempt from space-saving efforts. At West Point, with the exception of the professors, all instructors share an office with many others. The same is true at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth and the Army War College. At present, the War College faculty average

four per office. The situation will be improved somewhat when the new academic building is completed; the number will be reduced to an average of three per room!

Far better than any listing of the numerical data relating to working hours of the civilian scholar is the following description:

It is impossible for me, and I suspect that this would be true for others, to make a sharp break between working hours and nonworking hours in any single day, or working days and nonworking days in a single week. Scholarship and college teaching is a way of life and not a job. Some days I may work 18 hours; some days I may be travelling; other days I may be preparing lectures and lessons, etc. Writing, research, and teaching are not, for me at least, separate or clear-cut activities. They all relate to each other and are a part of the whole. The activities involved all center about my own field of interest, which is military history and affairs, and they may include such diverse things as teaching undergraduates, reviewing manuscripts and articles for professional journals and publishers, consulting with government agencies, a wide correspondence with those in my field, research, writing, book reviews, etc.²

Professor Morton's comments were confirmed by Gene M.

Lyons, who added:

Moreover, most of my effort is imposed on me by a schedule that I must set for myself and that need not, except in several respects, conform to any external institutionally-imposed setup. Thus, I might work at home, in my office, or in the college library--and during the day, the evening, or the weekend--and I might well carry work with me when I am on 'vacation.'³

²Louis Morton, letter to the author, 28 October 1965.

³Gene M. Lyons, letter to the author, 10 November 1965.

Dr. Lyons added that there is no rigid routine to academic life and thus no real comparison between the scholar and the military officer.

This statement is confirmed when one looks at the data from the military respondents. Over eighty percent indicated spending at least ten hours a day at their respective offices; 35 percent devoted 12 hours a day or more to official duties. Half of the sample spent six days a week on the job.

One cannot maintain, however, that all of the hours indicated are spent at one desk or in one office. Assignments include a variety of duties. The Nike Hercules battalion commander, for example, spends much of his day driving or flying to batteries of his battalion. The Air Force squadron leader spends much of his time in the air. The project officer for the Nike X program on Kwajalein Island spends much time with technical equipment. The attache, however, did not include the hours of required social activities in his total time! Most of the military group spend much time travelling.

The replies to the questionnaire revealed two decided contrasts: the scholar is provided with the surroundings which are most conducive to productive thought and he is enabled to establish his own schedule; the officer, by contrast, is required to conduct his activities in a crowded office with almost half of each 24-hour period devoted to his duty requirements.

Thompson maintains that creative atmosphere must be free from external pressure and, furthermore, that indulgence in time and resources is necessary.⁴ By contrast, to produce qualitative results the officer must, and has, developed a power of concentration which permits him to shut out his immediate environment and its distractions. It is evident to anyone who has read any of the excellent official studies prepared under these conditions that this has been accomplished successfully. However, the survey does raise a question as to whether or not better results would be obtained if better working conditions were provided.

It is possible that the long hours required may have been generated to some extent by inexperience. The rotational policy of the Armed Forces finds an officer on his way to a new assignment not later than three or four years after first reporting for duty. The questionnaire, for example, showed that less than ten percent of the respondents had been in their current assignment over two years while 50 percent had been in this job between one and two years. By contrast, all of the civilian scholars had been in their present positions three or more years.

Each of the civilian scholars was asked, "If you were in a government position, either civilian or military, could you have accomplished the same writing in addition to your normal governmental duties and without devoting more time than normally required for the government work day?" Although only 78 percent

⁴Victor Thompson, "Bureaucracy and Innovation," Administrative Science Quarterly, June 1965, p. 12.

of the group answered this particular question, every answer was an emphatic "No." Of special interest were the many answers citing personal experience in a governmental capacity.

The military groups were asked a similar question, "Do you feel that your work environment (office, hours, days, facilities, etc.) is conducive to serious thinking and scholarly writing?" Fifty-four percent of the Army respondents and 83 of the Air Force replied in the negative. However, when questioned "If you were given the opportunity, could you prepare for publication an unclassified work in the general field of strategy, working in your present environment and with some percentage of your time required for your present duties?", only one-third of the Army group and one-half of the Air Force replied in the negative. However, three-fourths of the replies to the second question qualified the answers by assuming that varying amounts of time up to one-half of each day would be free of all normal duties. Several answers also added, "Yes, if a quiet office would be made available."

The data from this survey was coorelated with information obtained by Lt Col William H. Tomlinson for his Army War College thesis.⁵ Tomlinson questioned 100 officers who had participated in the Army Civilian Schooling Program asking for comments

⁵ Lt Col William H. Tomlinson, Evaluation of the Department of the Army Civil Schooling Program.

regarding officers writing for professional publications. Over 80 percent of the replies received indicated that environment and time-duty requirements greatly lessened such efforts. This percentage compares favorably with the results obtained from the sample used in this study.

Several conclusions may be made from the answers received to both questionnaires:

1. Insofar as educational background is concerned, the scholars have more formal education at the graduate level.

2. The lack of formal education in the military group is balanced to some extent by their military education and by experience gained in military assignments.

3. There was no one field of primary interest common to the scholars other than their present occupation with strategy and national security.

4. Environment and time demands have a direct effect upon the military capability of producing a scholarly treatise.

TIME, TALENT, AND ENVIRONMENT

In discussing the problems involved in developing military scholars, Colonel George A. Lincoln, Professor of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, stated that four blocks prevented such development: talent, time, environment, and clearances.⁶

⁶Colonel George A. Lincoln, Personal Interview, 19 October 1965.

Time and environment and the art of flapsmanship are not conducive to serious thinking and professional writing. But what of talent? Do the military services have the innate talent capable of reaching the scholarly plateau?

There are scholars in uniform, scholars who are recognized even by the academic community. Colonels George A. Lincoln, Amos Jordan, and Wesley Posvar are all Rhodes Scholars and recognized experts in the social sciences. Generals Maxwell Taylor and Charles Bonesteel have the reputation of military intellectuals.

Some military officers do manage to write for general publication. Colonel Mark Boatner is known as an historian. Colonel Robert Ginsburgh, West Point Class of 1944, is the author of "US Military Strategy in the Sixties." Kintner and Hilsman, both former professional soldiers, now are included in the group of civilian scholars.

The West Point Class of 1944, from which the military sample was drawn, has eight men who are now professors in various universities. Two are deans: one at the Temple University School of Medicine, the other at Stevens Institute of Technology. Six members of the Class are now working with research "think" organizations. It should be noted in passing that these groups are adding many military retired officers to their staffs:

Colonel James Hayes at RAND and Lt Col Robert Rodden at Stanford Research Institute, for example.

There are many other scholars or potential scholars in the regular military establishment. However, as Brodie indicated,

Whether the Armed Forces have within their own ranks personnel who are equipped to ask the proper questions and to direct the relevant research is another matter. Of two things this writer is convinced: that they can have persons so equipped if they want to and that they should want to.

The potential exists; the question devolves into whether or not the military services need or desire to use the talented scholar as a writer and thinker on military strategy. Katzenbach describes this talent,

The military mind, of course, isn't unlike other professional minds. It deals with intellectual problems in basically the same way that the academic mind or the engineering mind or the legal mind attack their respective problems. It deals with very real, intellectual problems concerning the profession of arms.⁸

That talent, however, cannot be fully developed from a scholarly standpoint in the aura of flapsmanship in which it presently labors. It is restricted by:

. . . the apparently ceaseless flow of 'crash projects' and tension building studies which are now so much a part of every officer's job serving on a major staff, especially in the Washington area, in each of the services. Year after year, the Services bring competent officers to duty on top level service or joint staffs and then appear to make every effort to

⁷Bernard Brodie, "Strategy as a Science," World Politics, Vol. I, No. 4, July 1949.

⁸Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., Address at West Point, N. Y., 24 April 1964.

wear them out. The long hours, the weekends of work, the pressure of deadlines, the nit-picking of papers, and the ever-present bickering over minor details of joint plans and documents all tend not only to strain many officers physically and drain them emotionally, but to lower their spirits and their morale. The concern of their wives over these conditions is evidence of the seriousness of the problem.⁹

The long hours could easily be lessened; the crowded bullpens used as offices could be made less crowded; the pressures generated by useless "wheel spinning" could be greatly reduced. This would not only be an incentive for scholarly and professional writing, it would also produce more efficient duty results. But such action must come from the very pinnacle of the command structure. If this were to be done, the creative environment deemed necessary by Thompson would be available. Placed in this creative environment and provided with sufficient time, the military scholar might end the search for a modern Clausewitz, a new Mahan, a present-day Douhet.

⁹ Editorial, Journal of the Armed Forces, Vol. 10, No. 13, 28 November 1964.

CHAPTER 5

THOU SHALT NOT

CLEARANCES VIS-A-VIS CENSORSHIP

The talented military scholar who may be provided the necessary time and given the quiet atmosphere conducive to creative thinking still faces the fourth block mentioned by Colonel George A. Lincoln, the hurdle of obtaining clearance for his work. Without relief from the restrictions currently in force, he cannot write even for the exclusive use of his own profession. He lacks that academic freedom so essential

. . . to inquire, discover, publish, and teach the truth as they see it in their field of competence, without any control or authority except the control or authority of the rational methods by which truth is established.¹

It should be made absolutely clear at this point that the clearance requirements for security purposes are valid and

necessary. No professional officer questions their need; no responsible officer of mature judgment would knowingly violate security regulations. However, clearance or the denial of clearance for other reasons is most unduly restrictive.

Justice Douglas states that " 'Thou Shalt Not' (a recurring slogan throughout recorded history) has been used by each age to

¹Sidney Hook, Heresy Yes, Conspiracy No, p. 154.

shackle the mind and put severe restrictions on freedom of inquiry."² It can be seen that this is not a new problem.

These same restrictions--occasionally more severe, at times more lenient--have been in official effect in the Army since early in the century. Unfortunately, the time has long passed when the soldier may, as Upton stated, " . . . avail himself of his privileges as a citizen to expose to our people a system which, if not abandoned, may sooner or later prove fatal."³

Upton was speaking of a needed assessment of the military policy of the United States, of a reorganization of the Army, and of the need for a more realistic policy toward the reserve forces. One wonders, however, if his words could not be applied to the present day and the myriad of matters pertaining directly and indirectly to the national security of the United States.

Prior to the presidency of Woodrow Wilson, few bars were placed in the way of the officer who desired to write--or speak--on current affairs, strategy, and national security. In fact, officers on the active list often participated directly in the political arena. Winfield Scott was twice considered as a nominee at party conventions; George McClellan opposed Lincoln in the campaign of 1864.

²Justice William O. Douglas, Freedom of the Mind, p. 14.

³Maj Gen Henry Upton, The Military Policy of the United States, p. xi.

To the possible political aspirations of another officer, General Leonard Wood, must be given the credit--or the blame--for the first restrictive clearance requirements upon military writing and speaking. Huntington describes Wood's actions thus:

During the decade prior to American entrance into the World War, Wood was a leading figure in the drive for a positive national policy and the increase in America's armed strength. He played a major role in stimulating the outpouring of preparedness literature which flooded the country. His support for preparedness went far beyond the policies of the Wilson administration. His close personal ties with Roosevelt and the other Neo-Hamiltonians linked him with their violent attacks upon what they described as the pacifism and vacillation of Wilson. Wood himself was on occasion in his public speeches highly critical of his Commander in Chief. He was also thoroughly identified with the Republican Party and in 1915 and 1916 was openly receptive to the idea that he might become its presidential nominee.⁴

Although Wilson was not able to directly take action to stop Wood's activities (a decided contrast to the steps taken by President Truman in the situation involving General MacArthur) and although the hard-core professional officers of the Army did not agree with Wood's methods, Wilson addressed the problem in a letter to his Secretary of the Army in August 1914:

My dear Secretary, I write to suggest that you request and advise all officers of the service, whether active or retired, to refrain from public comment of any kind upon the military or political situation on the other side of the water It seems to me highly unwise and improper.⁵

⁴Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 280.

⁵Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon, p. 174.

This letter was followed by General Order #10 which states that:

Officers will refrain from giving out for publication any interview, statement, discussion, or article on the military situation in the United States or abroad, as any expression of their views at present is prejudicial to the best interests of the service.⁶

This order remained in effect throughout the war years and into the twenties. In 1922, however, the order was superseded-- but not with encouragement to express "personal views on the day" as is often stated.⁷ General Order #20, issued over General Pershing's signature, read:

The Secretary of War authorizes and desires public and private discussion on appropriate occasions by officers of the Army in support of the military policy of the United States as established by law and of the policies of the War Department in furtherance thereof designed to secure the national defense.

As the policies involved have been worked out with much care after a very full consideration of all the factors entering into the problem, it is desired, in order to avoid confusion, that they should be discussed from the standpoint of the War Department unless special authority for a different presentation is obtained.⁸ (Emphasis added.)

Thus, it can be seen that the limitation had been relaxed from no "public comment of any kind" as directed by Wilson to encouragement to discuss from the "standpoint of the War Department." In essence, this is the policy which remains in effect today.

⁶General Order #10, War Department, 23 February 1915.

⁷Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 397.

⁸General Order #20, War Department, 15 May 1922.

The author in uniform is required to submit for clearance anything he may write for general publication. If the subject matter does not concern a military topic, procedure or matter, the local public information officer may approve it for publication. If, however, the writing concerns military matters, foreign affairs, or national policy, or is in any way related to such topics, the work must be forwarded to the Freedom of Information Office, Office of the Chief of Information, Department of the Army.

Once the writing reaches this level, one of several actions is taken. If the article pertains only to the Army, it is reviewed in Army channels. Translated, this would mean that it is reviewed by officers in various staff sections having official knowledge sufficient to comment upon the contents of the particular item. However, if another service is discussed, or if the Department of Defense or any of its institutions are involved, the review is passed to the Department of Defense. If foreign affairs or national strategy or other nations are a part of the particular piece, Defense forwards the work to the State Department for comment and recommendation.

The process involved is time consuming and frustrating. One military author indicated a total elapsed time of seven months had been necessary to obtain clearance for a book with final approval entailing the deletion of two sentences and the changing of six words. Ironically, the two sentences were repeated verbatim elsewhere in the same book.

It is extremely difficult to understand the reasons for such a policy. Officials of the Department of Defense are unwilling to discuss the reasons, even informally, and will cite the regulation as the all-within-all governing security review. The author, for example, was refused permission to quote a Defense official's interview remarks and was told to "use the regulation."

Security is not and has not been the point at issue. No professional officer has any desire to violate security and, consequently, makes no attempt to avoid such restrictions.

The problem is far more complex and is colored by many factors. Certainly the actions of individual officers over the years--Wood, General Billy Mitchell, General MacArthur, Colonel Nickerson, and the admirals involved in the so-called "revolt"--contributed materially to the lack of confidence of the civilian in the chain of command. Fortunately, since the time of Leonard Wood, no active officer has permitted himself to be inserted directly into the political maelstrom. Eisenhower, Marshall, MacArthur all studiously avoided this pitfall. The professional soldier's abstinence from things political has not been violated. But personal crusades, as evidenced by Mitchell's efforts for air power, and interservice rivalries, as championed by the admirals, have done irreparable damage to the professional soldier-scholar.

As a result of the activities and efforts of these men for "causes" which, however justified at the time, only resulted in

more intensified restrictions, the scholar in uniform finds himself unable to publish a work on current strategic affairs. An excellent example is General Maxwell Taylor's "Security through Deterrence," written for Foreign Affairs magazine in the spring of 1956 but not published because of comments by both the Departments of State and Defense.⁹

The Stennis Committee--the Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services--filled several thousand pages with testimony directly related to clearances and the rights of the military to discuss matters of current importance. From the record of these hearings come the following quotations:

I say let our military speak--always under properly established policies and the general, not petty, supervision of their civilian superiors. Eisenhower¹⁰

. . . The day that any segment of our society--the military or any other--is prohibited from such discussion, we will have moved--not in the direction of proper restriction of activity--but in the direction of improper exercise of authority and the abridgement of freedom itself at its most basic level: that of free speech.

. . . There must be a degree of academic freedom allowed in the war colleges, in the service journals, and in academic journals when the military might contribute. It was due in part to the writings of Admiral Mahan that our country was as well prepared as it was for World War I. Let us not restrain any future Mahans. Often far-thinking officers in such writings sow the seeds for important new doctrines. Admiral Arleigh Burke¹¹

⁹General Maxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, p. 181.

¹⁰Senate Committee on Armed Services, Special Preparedness Subcommittee, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 6.

¹¹Ibid., p. 19.

Military men must be permitted to discuss unclassified military concepts and doctrines in their own professional journals with as little interference as is absolutely necessary in the best interests of the Nation. They must be able to do this even though there is a likelihood that some articles will be quoted in the public press and thus given additional circulation outside the military establishment. General Frederick H. Smith, Jr.¹²

The effect of extending security-review to thought-censorship is the creation of an atmosphere of apprehension that permits only narrow conformity in action and thought. The desire for standardization and conformity must not be permitted to erect a barbed-wire barricade on the frontiers of military intellect. Robert E. Hanson¹³

. . . Only continued discussion, public as well as internal, will hasten the desired understanding. I am not arguing that the military view is necessarily the wisest one. My only point is that it cannot be safely excluded from the general discussion of policy and means. Here, really, is the central problem: Given the world as it exists, how does the Nation fit what it has given the military into politics and doctrine that accord with our national philosophy and our material needs?

There is no way to do that except the traditional way--through discussion, a discussion in which the military view will have reasonable expression, within its competence and in accordance with long standing proprieties. This is common sense.

To isolate the military community from this most fateful discussion would have the effect of separating a substantial part of the American people--the part most directly concerned--from issues the outcome of which bears on us all. If the military are to be silenced in their field of competence, if they are to be discouraged from even hammering out their own doctrine among themselves in their own professional journals, where are the rest of the people to look for responsible and scrupulous advice on the issues of national defense?

¹²Ibid., p. 235.

¹³Ibid., p. 499.

Let us continue to look for that advice, as we are accustomed to do, in the free play of opinion among the parties most directly concerned, with no reputable voice excluded, least of all the military. General Nathan F. Twining¹⁴

Here are statements of censorship and charges of stifling; here are the eloquent pleas for freedom of thought; here are expressed the beliefs in the rights of the officer as a citizen and his duty to his fellow citizens. Nevertheless, despite such statements and pleas, the restrictions continue in effect. The restraining influence upon military participation in the vital discussions on the issues of this day, on strategy and national security, is the statement made by the Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, that, "It is inappropriate for any members of the Defense Department to speak on the subject of foreign policy."¹⁵ Does this differ materially from Wilson's instructions to officers to "refrain from public comment of any kind upon the military or political situation on the other side of the water."?

The problems faced and the headaches encountered by the soldier-author may be shown most graphically by the following quotations from recent denials for publication in a military journal:

An article such as this would be likely to have a very adverse reaction among Asian and African leaders.

It ignores and runs counter to current US policy.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 499.

¹⁵Raymond, op. cit., p. 176.

The proposal for multinational carrier forces with thermonuclear weapons is not current US policy.

It would be extremely unwise, in our opinion, for a US official of a US Government publication to sponsor publicly the views set forth in the question and answer section of this article.

Colonel _____'s article is returned without Army approval as it involves a sister service in a controversial light.

During the process of coordination and review, the following comments were received from the Federal Aviation Agency Under the circumstances it is not possible to endorse an article which expresses opinion or major program policies still under consideration by the Administration.

The United States and other western countries are at present seeking ways to assist the countries concerned in the reorganization and training of their internal security forces. Publication of this article, if it came to the attention of officials in those countries, could only hinder that important effort.

The assumption in the article of a possible US attack might, if published in an official US Government magazine, be interpreted by other countries, both Free World and Communist, as an indication of US plans for the future. In any event, it would be likely to be seized upon in Communist propaganda as substantiation of their accusations of aggressive intentions on the part of the United States. Publication, therefore, would not be in the best interest of the United States and might be harmful to our relations with numerous other nations.

These are the comments and reasons given for denying publication clearances for a military professional journal in the last six months. They involve articles written by Army and Marine officers and a civilian employee of the federal government. The themes or motifs of these actions are:

1. The article is contrary to current policy.
2. The article criticizes a sister service.
3. The article would have an adverse effect on other nations.
4. The article could be used for Communist propaganda.
5. The article expresses opinion on programs still under consideration by the Administration.

These denials were made despite the fact that articles in this journal carry the normal disclaimer: "Any views expressed in this article are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the US Army or the Department of Defense."

There are following other examples of denials which verge on the ridiculous. One clearance required changing this sentence, "Many of us, however, are too busy being infantrymen (or are not important enough) to attend this high falutin' institution and must seek more mundane methods to attain or improve speaking and comprehending a foreign language," to read, "Many of us, however, are unable to attend this institution" The reasoning behind the change directed was that the original wording violated Department of Defense policy by criticizing a Defense Institution, in this case the Language School!

Another officer was refused clearance on a fiction article which portrayed the reincarnation of a battle-tested hero, his

efforts to join the Central Intelligence Agency, the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force and his final acceptance by the Marine Corps. The request for clearance was disapproved, because the article criticized the Marine Corps--this despite the fact that the Marine Corps Gazette was interested in publishing the fictional story!

One has only to compare the articles not cleared to the titles of some of the works published by civilian scholars to gain an insight into the restrictions placed upon military writers. Could an officer, for example, have published Kahn's "On Thermo-nuclear War"? Would the Defense and State Departments have cleared Osgood's "Limited War" or Kennan's "Russia, the Atom, and the West" if these had been written by military scholars?

There can be little doubt that these clearance requirements have had and continue to have a most restrictive effect upon military writing for both general publication and for military journals. One cannot, however, state that such restrictions completely stifle or retard the thinking processes of the professional soldier, for the hundreds of very excellent classified studies in official files belie such a statement. These clearance requirements do and will continue to restrict any major publication efforts by military writers as long as present policies are in effect.

If a discussion of present foreign policy is completely objective, if the described actions and reactions of other nations

are based upon established fact and not upon fancy, if criticisms of the administration are not motivated by political ambitions but are instead based upon impartial and complete analysis of all sides of the issue in question, if the mental and methodological processes of the scholar are used, if parochial and single-service views are avoided, then there should be little reason for denying clearances, for imposing censorship, or for preventing the attentive American public from benefitting from the experiences and knowledge of the professional soldier. Unless some means can be devised of easing these restrictions, any effort of the professional soldier to enter the scholarly field of strategy and produce worthwhile works on national security is foredoomed.

CHAPTER 6

CRITERIA FOR SELECTING THE MILITARY SCHOLAR

Over three hundred years ago, Robert Burton said, "We can make majors and officers every year, but not scholars."¹ The statement remains as true today as in the seventeenth century. Moreover, one may paraphrase Burton's statement to "We can make majors and officers every year; we can produce scholars less frequently; developing an officer who is also a scholar is much more difficult."

Before investigating possible means of developing military scholars who would be capable of writing on strategy, the basic criteria for selection of such officers must be reviewed. It is not intended that this discussion be interpreted as providing a single and inflexible criteria for selection of officers for such a program. Such a result is impossible for producing a single criteria to be labeled "military scholar" and tagged with an MOS number is not feasible. The scholar must be viewed as an individual who stands by himself and not as a carbon copy of some artificial and shadowy standard. There are, however, certain basic qualities which can be used for guidance in selecting officers for a program of this type.

¹Robert Burton, Anatomy of Melancholy, Part I, Sect. 2, Memb. 3, Subsect. 15.

If the military scholar is to bring to the field of strategy the experiences of a soldier, if the purpose of his writing is to provide the soldier's interpretation of strategy, if he is to add the military viewpoint to discussions of national security, then the first and most essential quality is wide military experience. A young and newly commissioned lieutenant, for example, would not have the depth of military perception needed. The captain with little more than five years service and the young Leavenworth graduate both lack professional maturity. To provide the military judgment essential for objective and soldierly discussions of strategy, a relatively senior officer is needed.

Seniority in itself, however, is not and cannot be the sole basis for experience criteria. Mature and objective judgment do not necessarily come with age nor with years of service. Seniority must therefore be seasoned with the spice of military merit. The officer who accomplishes his routine and varied assignments in an outstanding manner can also be expected to do as well in making strategic analyses--if he is given the tools to make such studies effectively.

Some of these tools the officer gains through normal military assignment: command duty, staff work at various levels, military education in many service schools, and a wide variety of military assignments. All of these add to his military capabilities and to his military maturity.

No set pattern of experience is deemed mandatory, however. Command and staff assignment following the normal pattern, service overseas as well as at home, and military education, preferably through the War College level, are the basic requirements. The very fact that no two officers have identical military backgrounds is in itself a benefit for this permits bringing a variety of military experiences into the scholarly field in the same manner that the lay scholars have brought with them a wide variety of academic experience.

To the tools of military seniority and experience must be added the polish of education. Attendance at military schools up to and including the War Colleges is almost a mandatory requirement. Graduate study is the "finishing school" for the scholar; the War College is the equivalent for the soldier. The study of tactics and military strategy cannot be accomplished other than in an academic institution; staff experience cannot replace military education any more than reading law can replace attaining a law degree in an accredited law school.

Although attendance at one of the War Colleges is essential, there are a few officers who, because of other educational qualifications, would not materially benefit from attendance. These are men who have an extensive background, including graduate study in the social sciences. Assignment to the Military Academies and to some planning staffs--if judged upon the merits of the

individual concerned--could well eliminate a requirement for attendance at a War College.

Graduate study in a civilian university is also deemed advisable. This is not added for purposes of "snob appeal" or accreditation of the program in the eyes of civilian scholars. Graduate study develops an understanding of methodology and viewpoint not to be gained in any other way. It fosters an objectivity, an insistence upon factual proof which is a mandatory requirement for the scholar. Furthermore, graduate study develops an appreciation for academic freedom which, when added to the soldier's sense and knowledge of security criteria, will better permit the military scholar to think and write upon critical issues with freedom and yet without infringing upon security.

The exact field pursued in graduate study is immaterial. Although work in the social sciences and humanities would be preferable, study in the physical sciences also has advantages for a military scholar. Quite the contrary, the exact methodology of the scientist and the mathematical brings a discipline to the study of strategy which is desirable. Sir Alfred Zimmern confirmed this in discussing his visit to West Point by indicating that he had seldom, if ever, encountered a group of students better disciplined intellectually for the study of international politics. Furthermore, he added,

Concentration in the exact studies such as engineering is the best antidote to the vagueness and sentimentalism that has been such an obstacle to the study of the subject during the last twenty years.²

The wide experiences of the lay scholars would certainly indicate that graduate study in almost any field would assist the development of a scholar in uniform. Therefore, wide military experience and military education tempered with graduate study would provide an excellent basic criteria for selection of the potential soldier-scholar.

The proposed criteria for selection of military scholars may be criticized by some officers because no consideration has been given to assignment to high level staff. This criticism would be correct. Any argument that duty with the JCS, the Departments of the Army and Air Force, SHAPE, NORAD, or other similar staffs is important is valid. However, the relatively senior officer, the lieutenant colonel or colonel, with a War College background and a graduate degree will have served on one or more of these staffs in following the normal military career pattern. Consequently, listing service on a high level staff as a criteria for this program is not deemed necessary.

Service on the faculties of the Military Academy, the Command and General Staff College, or one of the War Colleges would be an asset. However, such service is not deemed essential.

²Dr. Alfred Zimmern, as quoted by Dr. George D. Stoddard, Address at West Point, N. Y., 20 May 1952.

The more restrictive the criteria for selecting potential scholars, the narrower the experience of the individuals selected. Consequently, from the standpoint of prior experience, the following criteria are deemed to be important as guides:

Grade: lieutenant colonel or colonel

Service: approximately 20 years

Military Education: War College

Civil Education: Graduate Degree

Assignments: normal career pattern of command and
staff, overseas and continental United
States

Performance: outstanding

These qualities relate to military background and education. In addition, there are a number of personal qualities and characteristics which must be considered. Although, admittedly almost nebulous in fact, they must be given full and due consideration.

The individual who enters a program for developing scholars must enter it only if he so desires. No officer should be required to participate. Placing a "required" label on the program would defeat one of its basic justifications by making it merely another public relations activity. Any scholarly effort to produce constructive military works in the field of strategy would be doomed to complete failure if it is to be used for public information purposes. Furthermore, one cannot order a soldier to

write if one believes Stephen Leacock's definition that "Writing is Thinking,"³ for one cannot order a man to think.

Russell Fudge lists several other qualities of the military student: proved judicial temperament, a sense of propriety, a gift for conceptual thinking, an insight into public comprehension, a tendency to an open and constantly inquiring mind, and a gift for expressing profound reflections in penetrating and easily understood language.⁴ These are excellent qualities which would become the military scholar.

Judicious temperament would enable the scholar to be completely objective in his work, basing his arguments upon sound facts in a logical manner. The sense of propriety would keep him from becoming involved in political affairs as well as tempering his criticisms of his own and sister services. By conceptual analysis he would determine the role of the military in strategy and its relation to other aspects of the national scene. The open and constantly inquiring mind would lead him to discount unsound theories and to seek new concepts when change is necessary-- but to accept the status quo when change is not required. The capability to write in a penetrating and easily understood language

³Stephen Leacock, as quoted by Major Mark M. Boatner, III, "Should Army Officers Write," Army, Vol. 6, No. 7, February 1956, p. 37.

⁴Colonel Russell O. Fudge, "Paging Colonel Mahan," Army, Vol. II, No. 6, January 1961, p. 59.

is a blessing given to few. Ideas can be developed in writing without coining new words and without the use of parochial or technical jargon. He writes best who writes simply and well.

To these qualities must be added one other: courage, the courage to express one's convictions. There is no place for the "yes" man in the ranks of scholars whether they be soldiers, lawyers, or academicians. The true scholar does not hesitate to express his objective findings even though he may realize full well that his words may not please all who read them. Objective writing cannot be produced if one is concerned about the reactions of his superiors or his audience. Productive writing, honest writing, cannot be accomplished if it is intended to reflect "what the boss wants." The courage required of the scholar is the courage of intellectual honesty.

These are the personal characteristics desired in the scholar, military or otherwise. The qualities that make the military scholar different from his civilian contemporary represent the sum total of his military experiences: his assignments and his schooling. An officer with these personal attributes and military qualifications could, if given the time and opportunity, provide the military interpretations so necessary to complete the discussions of strategy, foreign affairs, and the national security which are so vital to the American public.

CHAPTER 7

PROGRAMS FOR DEVELOPING MILITARY SCHOLARS

" . . . and the Voice of the Turtle is Heard"¹

In discussing the reason why the military as a group do not write, it was noted that four primary factors tended to limit their contributions: talent, time, environment, and clearances. Any program intended to develop military scholars--and hopefully to result in general publication of their writings--cannot ignore these factors if it is to be completely successful.

The talent needed for such a program must be selected from and developed within the officer corps, for the most part. However, the enlisted and warrant officer ranks should not be ignored completely, particularly as a source of informational data. With very few exceptions, however, the potential scholars will come from the officers of the Armed Services and, generally, could be expected to meet the qualification criteria discussed in Chapter 5.

Time and environment are important although not extremely critical. The environment and comparatively relaxed atmosphere of the academic world are far more conducive to serious study and writing than are the rush, the pressures, and the deadlines

¹Song of Solomon 2:12.

of today's major staff. Therefore, consideration should be given to establishment of a proper study environment for any program under consideration.

Clearance will be a problem for any program. Possible solutions for obtaining clearance approval of scholarly works must therefore be considered separately from each possible program discussed.

There are many alternative methods of developing military scholars of superior quality who are capable of producing serious works on strategy. However, these alternatives can be divided, like Gaul, into three major categories: career field concepts, sabbaticals and fellowships, and a miscellaneous group which can be termed "on-the-job" scholarship. In the pages which follow, these three major conceptual categories will be discussed in detail. Talent, time, environment, and feasibility will be considered as well as any advantages or disadvantages of each possible program. From these will be evolved one possible and feasible program which can be developed over a period of years.

THE CAREER FIELD CONCEPT

At first study, the establishment of a career field for military scholars appears to offer many advantages. Such a field would provide the specialist in strategy in the same manner that other special fields, such as public information and

logistics, develop their own experts. Briefly, such specialization would entail education and selected assignment to related jobs.

If such a career field were to be established, an officer with the required intellectual characteristics could enter the field at any time, even upon his being commissioned as a lieutenant. His entire career would be developed and monitored with the intent of fostering his individual ability to become an expert and recognized scholar in strategy.

Assignments which might be considered for such an officer would be the faculties of the Military Academy, the Command and General Staff College, and the War Colleges. Some Pentagon assignments on strategic planning staffs might also be anticipated. His military education should be maintained as close to the norm for other officers as possible. Civil schooling at different points in his career would be mandatory to enable him to pursue graduate work in closely allied fields.

Promotions would be made in normal consideration with his contemporaries in uniform. Efficiency reports could be rendered by fellow specialists who have an appreciation of his efforts and abilities. A value appreciation would be almost built in to such a career field, for its very establishment would indicate that the senior command echelon of the Army appreciated the need for that field.

Attainment of general officer rank need not be withheld from the strategic expert. To carry the career field concept to an extreme, the general officer positions at the Military Academy (the Dean of the Academic Board and the Superintendent), at Leavenworth, and at the War College (the Commandant and Assistant Commandant) might be reserved for career strategists. This would provide step-by-step promotions of dual nature: improvement from an academic point of view from instructor to professor to dean, and promotion through the normal military ranks from lieutenant to general officer.

Establishment of a career field, moreover, would provide the necessary talent on a continuing basis; establish a proper environment in the academic atmosphere of the War College, the Command and General Staff College, and the Military Academy; and would provide the necessary time for studious contemplation and writing. Research facilities would be available in the libraries of all three institutions, and contact with civilian institutions and scholars could not only be established but could be maintained easily.

The establishment of a special career field, however, would be most undesirable for it completely ignores one of the major reasons for producing military scholars: the presentation of the military concepts and theories of strategy developed by an intimate and long career as an Army officer who has followed the normal

career pattern. A career strategist, even with alternating assignments in normal military positions, would not have the intimate experience deemed essential for the military scholar. Instead of being a soldier expressing his professional scholarly opinions, he would become an academician in uniform.

Career progression to general officer in the manner outlined might appeal to the academician but not to the soldier. The present system of assigning these general officers from the line (with the exception of the Dean of the Faculty at West Point who is a career scholar) for relatively short duty tours brings a vitality and a direct tie with the Army in the field not to be gained in any other way. As a result, the curriculum of these institutions can be monitored and changed to reflect and provide for the changing requirements of the modern Army.

Furthermore, although some young officers would be satisfied with the inducements and benefits of permanent or alternating assignments in a specialized career field, many of those best qualified would prefer to follow the normal career patterns of the professional soldier. Not to be ignored is the possible development of disdain for the line officer by the scholarly expert and vice versa.

The advantages of the career field concept--continuity of effort, specialization, and proper environment--are dissolved by the elimination of direct and intimate experience with the day-to-day affairs of military life. No amount of reading of scholarly

works, no perusal of official documents, no extensive interview of other officers can ever replace the direct experience of living through the periods of crises in the arena of strategy and security. Without this experience, experience to be gained only through long years of service, the career scholar becomes an academician in uniform and not the professional military scholar desired. For these reasons, the establishment of a career field, even if feasible, is deemed not to be desirable.

SABBATICALS, GRADUATE STUDY, AND FELLOWSHIPS

The second major program category involves separating the potential scholar from his normal duties for a period of time to permit him to study and write. Three general divisions, each different, appear within this category: military sabbaticals, military fellows assigned to existing military institutions, and graduate study or fellowships at civilian institutions.

The sabbatical concept is not new for many industrial organizations and most civilian educational institutions provide their scholars with such leave. The Military and Air Academies recently established similar programs for their professors. Nor is the concept of a sabbatical to develop military scholars a new idea. Colonel Russell O. Fudge in 1961 recommended that such a program be established.¹ Fudge conceived a system which would assign a

¹Colonel Russell O. Fudge, "Paging Colonel Mahan," Army, Vol. II, No. 6, January 1961, p. 63.

number of officers to the War College annually where they would be "given a desk and turned loose." The military fellows in this proposal would be required to write.

Fudge's concept can be modified by assigning the officers to other institutions: Fort Leavenworth, West Point, or the Pentagon. Essentially, however, all would provide a small group of officers annually with the opportunity for study and research.

The Pentagon concept was recommended early in 1965 but was not approved. The proposal envisioned a small group of officers working in the Pentagon for a one year period with no requirement for producing a formal written work at the end of that period. The study contended that the end benefit would be an officer with a deeper understanding of strategy, based upon his study, and hence a better officer for the remainder of his career. Washington was considered the best site for this group to study because of libraries, official files, and official historical material available. Private office space and secretarial help were also considered essential.

Another variation of the sabbatical concept would permit the individual officer to select his place of study. In actuality, the exact place where the man studies is not important for the excellent means of communication existing today permit rapid travel to any point within the United States if not overseas. Travel restriction should not be a bar to access to original source material regardless of where that data may be located.

Consequently, permitting the officer to select his own base of operations--and it matters little whether it be Washington or Colorado Springs or Seattle--would have little result upon the ultimate outcome of his work and might have the advantage of seclusion by selection.

The advantages of the sabbatical concept apply primarily to time and environment. Study and research for a period of about a year in a suitable environment might bring the desired results. However, making publication of scholarly works a mandatory requirement would not be advisable for, inevitably, subcaliber results would ensue, results which would reflect unfavorably upon the program in the eyes of the Department of the Army and which would not be well received in the scholarly community. Careful selection of the officers would do more to ensure the type writing desired than would levying a mandatory requirement for x pages.

Actually, the sabbatical has a precedent of being used by the Army in the past. Sylvanus Thayer, later Superintendent of West Point and revered as "Father of the Military Academy" studied in Europe for two years from 1815 to 1817.² Sixty years later, General Emory Upton toured the world from 1875 to 1877.³ The mission given these two men was study: Thayer to study the Napoleonic concepts and the backgrounds of the French Army;

²USMA Register of Graduates, 1964, p. 16.

³Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States, p. 111.

Upton to investigate foreign military organization and thinking.

The benefits from the two-year "sabbatical" trips of these men were far reaching. Thayer based his development of the Military Academy upon his study of the European military schools, particularly the French L'Ecole Polytechnique. Upton incorporated many of the European concepts, particularly German, in his volume on military policy, and many of his recommendations were later adopted by Secretary of War Elihu Root. It is possible that similar benefits could come from a new and more extensive sabbatical program.

FELLOWSHIPS AT MILITARY INSTITUTIONS

Although very similar to the sabbatical concept, the establishment of military fellowships at existing military institutions would differ by providing supervision of the efforts of the scholar. The primary advantage would be supervision and discussion with other individuals interested in the general field of strategy.

Only a few American military institutions would qualify to receive military fellows: The Military Academy and the War Colleges. The Command and General Staff College, with its emphasis upon tactics and techniques rather than strategy would not be a suitable sponsor for a fellowship program.

Study at the Army War College would make available its excellent library. Furthermore, the scholar could attend the lectures given by a large number of experts in strategy, foreign affairs, and national security--civilian experts as well as military. Interviews with these lecturers could undoubtedly be arranged. The student body, composed of a large number of senior and mature officers with a wide variety of military experiences, would provide an excellent sounding board for discussion of the scholar's theories and concepts.

Faculty supervision, however, would not be particularly beneficial as long as present assignment policies prevail. The faculty is transient with little permanency. Furthermore, the officers concerned receive little if any special preparation or education as a general rule. The average member of the War College faculty is neither a scholar nor an academician; at best, the faculty as a group can only be termed amateur scholars. Therefore, their supervision of the military fellows should be held to a minimum.

Another possible disadvantage would be the tendency to call upon the fellow as an "expert" in a particular field to lecture, to supervise seminars, or to otherwise participate in the academic curricular study. It should be recognized that, regardless of the amount of expertise possessed by an individual, time is required to prepare for lectures or seminars. Consequently, participation in

the War College activities should be placed upon a request basis with the individual officer to be the one to determine whether or not he will participate.

Assigning military fellows to the Military Academy would undoubtedly place them under the sponsorship of the Department of Social Sciences. Here the fellow would study under the guidance of Colonels G. A. Lincoln and A. J. Jordan, both recognized experts in the field. The same would be true at the Air Academy where the Department is headed by Colonel Wesley Posvar.

Association with the faculty members would provide academic discussions with fellow military men who are educators and who have received special education for their work. Although the Academies are undergraduate institutions, the faculty should not be compared with the faculty of a civilian undergraduate college; for the Military Academy faculty combines academic learning with a military background, a combination of value to the fellow in his work.

There are other advantages to fellowships at the Military Academy. The excellent library and many lecturers who visit would provide source data and interviews. Ties with other institutions and with the lay strategists would be most beneficial. The proximity of these institutions--notably Harvard, Princeton, Yale, Columbia, MIT, and Dartmouth--would also prove beneficial. Nor can the facilities of the West Point Museum be ignored. The extensive

and excellent collection of arms and armament as well as many scholarly works on the use of weapons would provide excellent background for historical research.

In general, then, the military fellowships would provide the advantage of basing the fellow upon an existing military educational institution with its research and study facilities. Discussion would be available with fellow officers. Ties with civilian scholars would already exist or could be easily made. The major disadvantage at present is the lack of recognition by the lay scholarly community. This, however, would be eliminated if the proposed program were successful.

GRADUATE STUDY AND CIVILIAN FELLOWSHIPS

In the years since World War II, the Army has recognized the value of graduate education for its officers. Nearly 7,000 officers have received master's degrees as a result of entering the Army Civil Education Program. However, relatively few doctoral degrees have been earned and the majority of these have been in scientific fields.

Increased graduate study in the social sciences would be of great benefit, not only to any program to develop strategic writers, but also for strategic planning in general. Graduate study for a doctoral degree would provide an excellent opportunity to accomplish much of the needed research and writing techniques needed for

scholarly writing and might, in many instances, provide an almost complete work which could be published with little revision.

Many of the civilian scholars entered the field of strategic writing by publication of a doctoral dissertation. There is no reason for anticipating other results from military students at the doctoral level.

Service fellowships for the Army, Navy, and Air Force were initiated in 1958 at the Harvard Center for International Affairs. These are one year fellowships for study. The Air Force has extended this program to include fellowships at the following institutions:

Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research, Johns Hopkins University

Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University

Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania

Council of Foreign Relations, New York

Stanford Research Institute, Stanford University

Institute of Strategic Studies, London

A similar program for Army officers is well worth consideration. With other institutions conducting studies in the general field--Princeton, Ohio State, Chicago, and Wisconsin, to mention only a few--Army fellowships need not be duplicatory of the Air Force program. The advantage of study with the civilian scholars

recognized as experts cannot be overestimated. A year of exposure to their concepts, theories, and methodology could provide a new insight into the field of strategy insofar as the professional officer is concerned. The tendency toward professional isolation so prevalent to the military could be nullified. This new outlook would not only be beneficial to a potential writer but also to the staff officer and potential commander.

There is little need to mention the excellent research capabilities at these institutions. They lack only official government documents. Although direct and immediate access to these would not be available, there is no reason why the military scholar could not be provided funds to travel to the source of such data frequently: to the Pentagon or the War College.

In addition to exposure to the methodology and techniques of the scholar, the military fellow would benefit from study in the academic environment. His removal from the atmosphere of flapmanship would, in itself, be a decided asset. Although frequent discussion with his military contemporaries would not be possible, the discourses with the lay scholars of strategy would provide the soldier with a new audience, an audience even more critical than his own contemporaries.

ON-THE-JOB WRITING

Tomlinson's questionnaire⁴ received the following comments from officers (lieutenant colonels, colonels, and general officers) regarding professional writing:

Those officers that write professionally do not necessarily contribute the most in their military assignments or getting the job done. Their overall contribution to the service may be greater but their job suffers while they devote more energies to writing and someone else generally has to pick up the slack.

If a man is doing a full time conscientious job in his assigned work, he doesn't have time to do the research necessary to back up any efforts in professional writing.

There are just not enough hours in the day for a busy officer who works anywhere from 12-16 hours.

Mark Boatner, however, takes the opposite viewpoint saying

But the most common rationalization is to pretend that the officer who gives his all to the job does not have time to write. What rot! Look at the time we seem to have available for golf, bridge, and TV. No one 'has the time' for anything he does not enjoy doing or considers unimportant.⁵

Boatner personifies his beliefs. He is the author of several books, including the monumental "Dictionary of the Civil War," and has also authored many articles for civilian and military journals alike.

⁴Lt Col William H. Tomlinson, Evaluation of the Department of the Army Civil Education Program.

⁵Major Mark M. Boatner, III, "Should Army Officers Write?", Army, Vol. 6, No. 7, February 1956, p. 37.

The key to on-the-job writing is cited by Boatner: no one will find the time for anything unless he enjoys doing it or considers it important. That sense of importance, insofar as professional writing is concerned, must come from more than just the author, however. The lack of appreciation or "value" of writing by ones superiors is most essential.

Despite the many questions raised at all levels regarding the failure of professional officers to write for publication, there is still a lack of appreciation by contemporaries and superiors alike. Too often there is an expressed feeling that the officer who appears in print is trying to publicize himself, get his name before the military public, and thus influence his career. While this may be true to some extent, the sincere efforts of many young officers gain little attention; and, all too often, the young scholars do not continue to develop their capabilities by further effort.

The impetus to foster "on-the-job" writing must also come from the top. It is not intended that such writing literally be done in the office or during normal duty hours. However, if one's duty schedule is slack, what is wrong with working on a professional paper? The author and his contemporaries were taught as cadets that the professional soldier could look forward to a 24-hour duty day; that there were no "duty hours"; that the eight to five day belonged to the civilian. There is no overtime pay for the

soldier. If such be the case, any writing the officer does is done on "government time." Occasional scholarly work in the office should not be prohibited--if it does not interfere with duty requirements.

Sincere value appreciation, moreover, can only come from the top echelons of the Armed Services. Proper and constant recognition of scholarly efforts at all levels would do much to foster such efforts by the rank and file of the officer Corps. For example, a letter from the Chief of Staff to an officer author praising a truly outstanding work would cost little in dollars or effort and would provide added incentive. A copy of such a letter should be placed in the officer's permanent file.

Individual recognition of this type, however, is only one small part of building service-wide appreciation of scholarly efforts. Frequent and emphatic statements directed to the entire officer corps are necessary. These statements should be published in the service journals as well as distributed in normal administrative channels.

One excellent means of fostering professional writing would be the establishment of an annual competition by the Chief of Staff of the Army. Such a competition might be named after an Army scholar who has contributed to the field, possible the late Brigadier General Herman Beukema, for many years Professor of Social Sciences at the Military Academy and a widely recognized

scholar. Such a competition should offer substantial monetary awards as well as permanent trophies. Judges might well include civilian scholars as well as professional officers. Writings submitted might be published in professional journals--a special issue of Military Review, for example--or in civilian journals. This, of course, assumes that clearances can be obtained. Classified articles should be encouraged with distribution applicable to the degree of security involved. Such a competition, however, should not result in an automatic award regardless of the quality of the entries. Quite the contrary, if suitable articles are not entered, no award should be made.

Not to be ignored is the fact that any officer who might participate in graduate study, fellowship, or sabbatical programs will have to continue his efforts in addition to his normal duties once he has left the program. Proper recognition of scholarly writing is even more important, therefore, to insure the continued study and output of the scholar in uniform.

Although writing on the job can be encouraged, it is not the best means of obtaining the desired professional results. The continuity of effort, proper study habits, research methods, and undisturbed contemplation are difficult to attain after a full day of normal duties. It can be done, however, if the individual officer has the desire and interest and if proper value appreciation stems from the higher command echelons of the Service.

ONE FEASIBLE PROGRAM

There are many programs which might be recommended for consideration by the Department of the Army. All, however, must have the objective of developing military scholars worthy of consideration on the same plane as the most excellent civilian strategists who are today's experts. Any such program, therefore, must consider the following factors which are not necessarily arranged in order of priority:

Support and encouragement at all levels of command.

Availability of well qualified officers.

Establishment of a proper study and time environment.

Clearances.

Supervision and evaluation.

The support of all echelons of command is absolutely essential if any such program is to be successful. Token or voice support will not be sufficient. Therefore, the vociferous and enthusiastic support of the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, and other senior commanders must be obtained. The establishment of an annual competition by the Chief of Staff would be a substantial step in the proper direction.

Availability of those officers best qualified is important if the program is to be successful. It is realized that many of the very officers who would be the best scholars are also the same officers sought after to fill key staff and command positions.

To insure that these officers would be available for the program, a high priority, similar to attendance at the War College, would have to be established. Participation, however, should not be mandatory; only officers who so desire should be selected. A high priority of this type would be, moreover, another indication of the value with which the program is viewed by the Department of the Army.

Although some writing can be done individually, it is believed that an academic environment is more conducive to scholarly work. Consequently, the establishment of military and civilian fellowships would produce the best scholar and the most scholarly works. Initially, consideration should be given to graduate study followed by utilization tours at the Academies and the War Colleges. The combination of study followed by academic experience would do much to foster scholarly writing.

Without resolution of the clearance problem, however, all efforts to develop military scholars would be extremely difficult. It is not believed that this problem can be resolved as long as clearance of scholarly writings is made by the information sections of the Departments of Defense and the respective services. If such clearances must be obtained--and the author seriously questions this necessity--then the clearance procedure should be provided by a special group especially established and trained for that specific purpose. Such a group should function directly under the Chief of Staff of the Army and not under some subordinate echelon.

Although supervision and evaluation are important, it is not believed that these provide any great handicap or restriction to the establishment of a program. The primary requirements are to ensure that a scholar is not unduly penalized in efficiency reports simply because he has written for publication and that his writing does not reflect the ideas and opinions of his superior.

With these thoughts in mind, the following program is offered as a feasible and logical approach to develop military scholars:

1. Establishment of an annual competition sponsored by the Chief of Staff with proper and substantial awards.
2. Assignment of a small number of officers--two or three initially, as many as six eventually--to the Military Academy and to the Army War College as military fellows for a period of one year. Area of study would be selected by the individual. There would be no mandatory requirement for publication but such should be encouraged.
3. Increased graduate study in the social sciences.
4. Increased doctoral study in the social sciences.
5. Establishment of a fellowship program similar to that sponsored by the Air Force.
6. Establishment of a very limited number of sabbatical programs for highly selective officers who have already demonstrated scholarly capabilities. Such sabbaticals should be for one year or less with the officer concerned selecting his place of study.

The program so briefly outlined could be initiated immediately by announcing the competition. Establishment of the military fellowships could be made within a year as could selection for graduate study at master or doctoral level. The establishment of a fellowship program would, however, require more time and investigation by a special study group. Such a committee, possibly headed by Colonel G. A. Lincoln or Colonel A. J. Jordan, would complete the study within the year. Obtaining approval from Department of the Army and from the civilian institutions concerned, as well as selection of duly qualified officers, would probably require an additional year. This program could, if expedited, therefore be initiated in calendar year 1968. The establishment of sabbaticals should, however, be held in abeyance until the success of other parts of the program has been proven.

CONCLUSION

The development of a program to produce military scholars is essential if the voice of the soldier is to be heard among the scholars discussing strategy. The program outlined in this study is feasible and could be initiated immediately. Over a period of years, a number of military scholars would be developed. There can be no guarantee that they will produce writings of worth. But, in addition to the "know-how" of their military experience, they will have the "think-how" of the scholar. The

professional soldier, instead of withdrawing his head, like the turtle, into his shell when in the company of the lay scholar, can be enabled to speak well and authoritatively.

" . . . and the voice of the turtle is heard."


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